style of philosophical writing. Austrians sought to develop philosophy as a rational enterprise, often taking the natural sciences as their model, typically employing a language which is, by comparison to that of their North German counterparts, marked by a concern for logical clarity and by a ploddingly pedantic concern for exactness and comprehensiveness. 6 Many Austrian philosophers are distinguished by the fact that they employed an aprioristic method distinguished from that of Kant in that it rested on a commitment -best illustrated by the writings of Husserl's early disciples in Munich and Freiburg -to the existence of a broad range of synthetic a priori truths, embracing domains such as perceptual psychology, ethics, aesthetics and law. And we can recognize also a powerful strain of methodological individualism -a concern to understand macro-phenomena in terms of the individual mental experiences which underlie or are associated with them 7 -where Germans turn, instead, to larger social wholes, and to speculative history à la Marx or Hegel.
We can also point to certain characteristic types of problem dealt with by Austrian philosophers. In particular we can note that the Austrians are often at one with Anglo-Saxon philosophers in awarding a central place in their work to the problems of logic and of the philosophy of science. See Mulligan, in this connection, on "Genauigkeit und Geschwatz. Glossen zu einem paradigmatischen Gegensatz in der Philosophie", in H. Bachmaier (ed.), Wien: Paradigmen der Moderne, Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1990, 209-236. 7 Wolfgang Grassl and Barry Smith (eds.), Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background, London: Routledge, 2010. 8 Barry Smith, "The Neurath-Haller Thesis: Austria and the Rise of Scientific Philosophy", in K. Lehrer and J. C. Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Kluwer, 1996, 1-20. That the above is not an empty characterization is seen by observing how rarely the mentioned features are manifested in the works of the principal philosophers of Reichsdeutschland. The latter are marked, to varying degrees, by hostility to science, by the running together of philosophy, politics, and religion, by a blindness to logic, and by the privileging of style over substance. Obvious exceptions, leaving aside mathematicians in Jena or Göttingen, were all too often, as in the case of Stumpf, heavily influenced by figures central to the Austrian tradition.
One illustration of these last two points is the extraordinarily impressive and influential philosophy of the social sciences 18 , to which also the young György Lukács belonged. Perhaps the most sophische Studien, 50, (1995) 591-601. 15 Tamás Demeter, "The sociological tradition of Hungarian philosophy", Studies in East European Thought, 60 (2008), 1-16. 16 interesting Hungarian case among the latter is Melchior Palágyi Palágyi himself, in his Kant und Bolzano, criticizes Bolzano for neglecting the degree to which language is the medium of thought, so that the idea of propositions or meanings in themselves represents an incoherent dualism.
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The counterpart view -that meaning (Meinen) is necessarily bound up with an expression -is enunciated also by Reinach, 23 as Mulligan himself points out, in a passage from "Getting Geist" (loc. cit.) which also refers to Palágyi:
When phenomenologists, early and late, clamour that the introduction of "thingly" categories into the description of mind is an error which has catastrophic consequences, the positive alternative analysis they have in mind is that given by Reinach (and, first of all, by the Hungarian philosopher, Palágyi).
As Mulligan also points out, 24 Palágyi's distinction between punctual mental acts (for example acts of meaning something with an expression, acts of willing) and temporally extended experiences such as are involved in seeing or hearing or worrying about something, anticipates a large number of related distinctions in twentieth century philosophy -in Klages, Scheler and Dordrecht, 1994, p. 201. 21 Claire Ortiz Hill, "Husserl and Hilbert on Completeness", in Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995. 22 J. C. Nyíri, "From Palágyi to Wittgenstein", loc. cit. 23 Reinach, A. "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils", in A. Pfänder, ed., Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen, Leipzig: Barth, 1911, 196-254; reprinted in Reinach 1989, 95-140; Eng. trans 
Ákos von Pauler
The principal object of our investigations here, however, is not Palágyi but his near 
Pauler's Logic
By the 1920s Pauler has established himself among his contemporaries as the foremost 26 Somos, "Zwei Schüler Brentanos: Ákos von Pauler und Meinong", op. cit., p. 601. 27 We can infer that it was in his discussions with Pauler in this period that Brentano remarked that 'Bolzano's work exerted a significant influence on his own thinking, but that the traces of this influence are to be found not so much in his own essays, but in the world of thought of his students, especially Husserl. See Pauler, "F. Brentano 1837 -1917 ", Athenaeum 1918 The latter, particularly, rings heavily with the thought of Bolzano. The object-domain of logic Pauler conceives as the totality of truths in themselves or Wahrheiten. This domain is ruled by principles which others might well call metaphysical, and which include, beyond the laws of identity, contradiction and excluded middle, also the 'laws' of connection (everything is connected with everything else); of classification (everything can be classified); and correlativity (there is nothing relative without an absolute).
The ontological status of truths in themselves is distinct from that of the real objects and events of the material world; truths enjoy, rather, a mode of existence which Pauler (following Lotze) calls Gültigkeit or validity. That which enjoys Gültigkeit (besteht or subsists, in Meinong's terms) is atemporal, thus unchangeable, and incapable of bringing about effects in other things. It is independent of all mental acts of thinking subjects and would exist even in a world entirely denuded of such subjects. Thus Pauler's Wahrheiten closely resemble Bolzano's Sätze an sich, though since, for Pauler, falsehoods have no Gültigkeit, there are no false Sätze an sich in the Paulerian ontology. This is almost the only significant difference between Pauler's and Bolzano's conceptions of the province of logic, and we can note that a similar preferential treatment of the true can be found among other Austrian realists, such as Meinong and Marty. 
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The locus of the false, for Pauler, lies not within the ideal sphere of Gültigkeit, but rather within the factual realm of human judgments. Each actually executed judgment constitutes an approximation to one or more propositions in the realm of truths in themselves; false judgments are distinguished by the fact that the degree of approximation is maximally small.
For Pauler, as for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, the totality of Wahrheiten is conceived as forming a system. It is the object of pure logic to investigate the structure of this system on the one hand, and to determine the relationship between the system and the world, on the other. to designate the ultimate constituents out of which truths are composed. The logisma is the atom of the discipline of logic. It is thus contrasted with entities in the reality to which the truth relates on the one hand, and with the knowledge act in which the truth is grasped psychologically on the other. Like Bolzano's Vorstellung an sich it is introduced as part of an attempt to remove the ambiguity underlying the traditional concept of concept (or Begriff) as between a logical content and a product of a mental operation.
Pauler and the Picture Theory

31
What applies to the constituents of the elementary proposition applies also to the constituents of its psychological correlate, the thought:
I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out. (Letter to Russell, from Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, p.72) .
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See Pauler, Logik (op. cit.), pp. 62 ff.
The logismata which make up a true proposition stand to things in the world in what Pauler explicitly refers to as a 'mirroring relationship' -the word 'thing' being understood widely enough to comprehend objects, properties and relations, and both concrete particulars and universals in the world around us.
To understand in more detail Pauler's account of the relationship of picturing, it will be necessary to say a few words about the traditional theory of logic against which Pauler, like
Bolzano before him, reacted, but from which both also drew their inspiration. According to this traditional theory, the subject-matter of logic is the totality of judgments (understood not as ideal entities related together in an atemporal, ideal system, but as concretely existing mental entities).
The constituents of a judgment are conceived as ideas or concepts in the mind of the judging subject at a given moment and the judgment is conceived as a binding together, in thought, of a plurality of concepts.
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Where Frege, for example, had rejected this traditional theory by arguing that logic has no business at all with the bare and fleeting ideas or Vorstellungen which inhabit people's minds, Pauler adopted a more lenient view. He recognized, first of all, that there is a proper place for a discipline which would investigate, from a logical rather than a psychological point of view, the properties of our thinking acts. He insisted only that this discipline be acknowledged as an applied logic; it is not identical to, because it presupposes, the discipline of pure logic, which is concerned exclusively with the properties of the ideal system of truths.
Pauler's principal charge against Aristotle and the traditional logicians was thus that they had 33 Normally we have to deal with a pair of concepts, the subject and the predicate. This 'binding of concepts' theory of the judgment clearly faces severe difficulties when it is required to give an account of the negative judgment: cf. Reinach, "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment", loc. cit.
confused the applied science of judgment with the pure logic of truth, and that they had failed to recognize the necessity of the latter as a precondition for the former. He did not hold that the traditional logicians had been confused in their view of the judgment as in some sense a complex of concepts; rather, he takes this account as the starting point of his theory of the logismata, and thus also of his theory of the relation between proposition and fact, but conceiving the logismata as something objective, forming a gigantic, relationally ordered system, from which the judging subject needs to make a kind of 'selection'.
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Taking the individual concretely executed judgment as his starting point, as Pauler sees it, the logician carries out a process of idealization to arrive at the corresponding ideal truth in itself. The latter is something like a prototype of the former, from which every imperfection of content and all incompleteness and one-sidedness have been removed. Similarly the logisma is an idealization of the concretely existing concept, and if we can believe that we understand the relation between concept and thing, then we can extrapolate from this understanding in grasping the relation between logisma and thing. This will involve a combination of the Brentanian and Husserlian theories of intentionality -there is a directedness of logisma towards the thing -and also of Meinong's theory of objects -which for the first time provides, in Pauler's eyes, the means to do justice to the entire expanse of thought in embracing both what exists and what does not exist. philosophical mission.' Citing the Russian novelist and terrorist leader Boris Savinkov, he goes on to point out that, while 'murder is not allowed, it is an absolute and unpardonable sin', still it 'must' be committed. … the ultimate moral basis of the terrorist's act [is] the sacrifice for his brethren, not only of his life, but also of his purity, his morals, his very soul. In other words, only he who acknowledges unflinchingly and without any reservations that murder is under no circumstances to be sanctioned can commit the murderous deed that is truly -and tragically -moral. Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
Pauler's wholly unsympathetic reply (translated by me here into German) is: in der Vernunft! Opposite the remark, at 6.421, to the effect that 'Ethics und aesthetics are one', Pauler accuses Wittgenstein of 'journalistic shallowness', which is of course exactly the sort of criticism which Wittgenstein's hero Karl Kraus leveled against his contemporaries.
The overwhelming impression is that of an intelligent and careful reading, Pauler's most serious criticism of Wittgenstein as a logician being that he fails to live up to his own exhortations on the avoidance of 'logical nonsense'. And again, such a positive reception would be astonishing were it not for the shared Austrian background of the two philosophers.
Logical Principle and Mathematical Axiom
At the very end of his life, Pauler authored a paper entitled "Logical principle and mathematical axiom", 39 the manuscript of which was published by his students after his death. Where for Wittgenstein, philosophical assertions belong to the realm whereof we cannot speak, for Pauler philosophical assertions are like other assertions -not least in that they are subject, too, to the principles of logic, They do, indeed, involve a certain self-referential aspect -it is for this reason that skeptical theses are nonsensical -and this self-referential aspect is ineliminable. But this is a discovery about philosophical assertions; one that can be stated in other philosophical assertions, which are once again themselves subject to the principles of logic. 
